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Efforts requiring banks to divulge informa-
tion on their financial condition have a long his-
tory. In the early 1800s, some states required
banks to file reports of condition with the gov-
ernor or legislature, arguing the state was a
shareholder in the banks and therefore entitled
to the information (Robertson 1995). However,
the reports contained only broad breakdowns
of assets and liabilities and no information bank
directors did not wish to disclose. In 1869,
Congress empowered the comptroller of the
currency to “call” for a full statement of condi-
tion from national banks several times a year.
Regulators have since made many changes to
the resulting call report, but its purpose re-
mains the same—to provide timely information
regarding the condition of banks.
The modern call report, or Report of
Condition and Income, is filed quarterly by all
banks and contains hundreds of accounting
items that regulators and private analysts use to
characterize the financial condition of both indi-
vidual banks and the industry. Call reports now
include detailed measures of assets, liabilities,
revenues, expenses, and off-balance-sheet activ-
ity. The level of detail is somewhat greater for
large banks than for small ones, but even small
banks file an extensive report.
This article analyzes call report revisions
to assess the extent to which regulatory exams
promote accurate data. If the loan-loss account-
ing in call reports is widely used to measure
loan quality, the findings support the view 
that exams are important in the public dissemi-
nation of accurate information on banks’ finan-
cial condition.
DISCLOSURE OF LOAN LOSSES
An old saw in banking is that making loans
is easy, but getting paid back is hard. While
banks have developed a substantial tool kit for
identifying creditworthy borrowers, all loans
entail some risk and inevitably, some will not be
repaid. A loan that appears sound at origination
may deteriorate in quality and eventually become
a loan for which repayment is highly unlikely.
Because loans are a primary banking product, a
true picture of a bank’s overall financial condi-
tion often depends on the accuracy with which
loan portfolio problems have been identified and
measured. As a result, the accuracy of the line
items pertaining to loan quality and performance
has the potential for determining a call report’s
usefulness in tracking financial developments.
The banking industry uses a specialized
system to account for loan quality problems, at
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the heart of which is the allowance for loan and
lease losses (ALLL). Through provision for loan
and lease losses, banks add funds to ALLL. These
provisions are an expense item and reduce a
bank’s net income.
1 The ALLL balance is sub-
tracted from total loans, so that loans on the 
balance sheet are reported net of ALLL. When
loans are charged off, total loans are reduced by
the amount of the losses, but the losses are
charged against ALLL, leaving net loans un-
affected.
2 If a bank recovers some of the losses
on loans previously charged off, the recoveries
are added back to ALLL.
When a bank charges off a loan, the
resulting loss does not affect reported prof-
itability, since the charge-off is against ALLL.
Credit quality problems affect reported profit-
ability when a bank incurs the provision ex-
pense, since the expense directly reduces net
income. As a result, timely disclosure of infor-
mation on credit quality and its impact on over-
all operating results depends on the degree to
which provisions are made in anticipation of, or
concurrent with, actual impairment in the loan
portfolio. If adequate provisions are made only
after the impairment occurs, profitability prior to
the provisions is overstated.
Regulatory guidance directs banks to
make provisions if ALLL is insufficient to absorb
estimated credit losses. However, the definition
of estimated credit losses highlights the difficulty
in pinpointing an appropriate level for provi-
sions:  “Estimated credit losses are anticipated
losses that are reasonably expected to occur but
whose amounts or obligors cannot be specifi-
cally identified” (Federal Reserve Board of Gov-
ernors 1999). Because assessing the adequacy
of ALLL and the need for provisions is based 
on an estimate of losses, in many cases it may
only be possible to determine a range of suit-
able levels for provision expense, rather than
the single most appropriate level. In addition,
exam findings can lead banks to charge off
some existing loans, thereby reducing ALLL and
potentially requiring additional provisions.
EXAMS AND TRANSPARENCY
Various incentives may induce banks to set
provisions outside the range commensurate with
credit quality. In response, policymakers have
sought to blunt or counteract these incentives.
Banks can reduce the variability of
reported income by making higher provisions
than necessary when credit quality and net
income are high. In this case, provisions would
not have to increase as much if credit quality
were to deteriorate. This form of income smooth-
ing might lead outside observers and investors
to regard banks as more stable and less risky
than they are.
3 An undesirable aspect of such
income smoothing is that it could make a bank’s
financial condition less transparent to the users
of financial statements.
4
Potential tax benefits are another incentive
for manipulating loan-loss provisions. Before the
1986 Tax Reform Act, provisions were treated as
a deductible expense, and setting higher provi-
sions often lowered taxable income. However,
for banks with assets over $500 million, the act
linked the amount of a bank’s deduction to its
actual charge-off experience (Walter 1991).
Another factor that might prompt banks to
set an inappropriate level of ALLL and provision
expense involves regulatory or market-based
penalties for a deterioration in financial condi-
tion. Risk-based capital requirements allow
banks to count ALLL only in Tier 2 capital and
only up to 1.25 percent of risk-weighted assets
(Kwan and O’Toole 1997). By not making the
necessary provisions, banks with asset-quality
problems can raise reported net income and re-
tained earnings, thereby boosting Tier 1 capital
and potentially avoiding the numerous restric-
tions regulators typically place on troubled
banks.
Given the current institutional framework,
which assigns regulators a large role in the
monitoring and disciplining of banks, this latter
incentive provides a particularly strong reason
for regulatory exams. The Commercial Bank
Examination Manual states that “the examiner’s
responsibility to determine the adequacy of a
bank’s ALLL is one of the most important func-
tions of any examination” (Federal Reserve
Board of Governors 1999). In verifying the 
adequacy of ALLL, examiners consider informa-
tion obtained during the current and prior
exams, loan quality trends and peer group data,
processes for internal credit review, past-due
and restructured loans, and economic conditions.
If after considering these factors an examiner
finds that a bank’s ALLL is too low, the institu-
tion normally is required to increase its provi-
sion expense and raise ALLL to the desired level.
5
Several studies support the view that trou-
bled banks often have insufficient ALLL and that
exams are important in helping correct the
problem. The General Accounting Office (1990,
1991) finds troubled or failing banks often have
insufficient ALLL. Similarly, Berger, King, and
O’Brien (1991) discuss the potential for insuffi-
cient ALLL, particularly when a bank has not
been examined recently. Gilbert (1993) providesFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 32
evidence of atypical movements in call report
data for the quarters in which banks are down-
graded by examiners.
Setting provisions requires detailed knowl-
edge about a bank’s loan portfolio. Regulators
and, especially, bank managers are more likely
than outsiders to have such detailed knowledge.
If an exam aligns provision expense and ALLL
with credit quality, it may facilitate the public
communication of important bank-specific
information and thereby enhance banking sys-
tem transparency.
Consistent with this view, Docking, Hir-
schey, and Jones (1997) find a bank’s announce-
ment of loan-loss provisions adversely affects
that bank’s stock price and sometimes the stock
price of other banks as well. Berger and Davies
(1998) provide evidence that quarterly financial
statements are a conduit for transmitting exam
findings to financial markets. And Flannery and
Houston (1999) find exams affect the relation-
ship between a bank holding company’s market
and book value, possibly reflecting the im-
proved accuracy of financial statements follow-
ing an exam or a certification effect whereby
exams serve as a stamp of approval on pub-
lished financial statements.
Other researchers have reached a different
conclusion, however, arguing essentially that
outsiders can see through a bank’s loan-loss
accounting and discern the true quality of its
loans, even if provisions and ALLL are lower than
necessary. Wall and Koch (2000) cite several
studies that indicate investors often do not react
to announcements of loan-loss provisions, pre-
sumably having already effectively estimated
the extent of the deterioration in bank loan
portfolios. If, without substantial cost, outsiders
can accurately estimate losses in a bank’s loan
portfolio on the basis of other information, the
benefits of exams in assessing loan quality and
the sufficiency of ALLL may be limited mostly to
the supervisory process itself, as opposed to the
promotion of financial transparency in general.
These earlier studies address important
issues. Do banks sometimes set provisions be-
low what is needed to cover their loan losses? If
so, how often does this occur and by what mag-
nitude do banks underreport? Are exams effec-
tive in promoting adequate levels of ALLL? And
finally, do provisions and ALLL convey useful
information to outsiders about banks’ financial
condition? The following analysis addresses
some of these issues further by providing evi-
dence based on the incidence and size of revi-
sions to call report data.
Sample
The analysis examines call report revisions
to gain insight into exams’ role in promoting
accurate financial information. Given the impor-
tance of information on loan quality in assess-
ing banks’ overall financial condition, the analy-
sis is limited to provision expense revisions. To
focus on safety and soundness concerns, most
of the analysis is directed at upward revisions. If
examiners determine the provision expense a
bank reports is inadequate, they may require
the bank to make additional provisions and
refile one or more recent call reports to reflect
the change.
6 It is important to note, however,
that not all exam findings on provisions neces-
sarily require call report revisions. If additional
provisions are necessary, the expense may sim-
ply be reflected on a bank’s subsequent call
report. Nevertheless, the revisions provide a
unique window through which to view the
results of exam activity.
The data this study uses are obtained from
files at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas and
are limited to commercial banks, year-end
1996–98. The originally reported data are from
files transmitted from the Federal Reserve
Board, seventy to eighty days following the
report dates. The revised data are for the same
report dates but were transmitted from the
Board in May 2000. Any differences between
the original data and the data obtained in May
reflect revisions made sometime after the data
were published as “final,” which typically occurs
about sixty-five days after the report date.
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Several additional restrictions frame the
analysis. First, the sample is limited to banks that
received a satisfactory rating on the last exam
prior to the report date.
8 Focusing on these banks
facilitates an assessment of whether new or
emerging problems are freely divulged by banks
Table 1
Provision Expense as a Percentage of Average Assets, 
Year-End 1996–98
No revision Downward revisions Upward revisions
Reported Reported Revised Reported Revised
Percentile
25 .03 .09 .00 .11 .30
50 (median) .12 .26 .16 .25 .52
75 .24 .42 .29 .49 1.00
Average .18 .37 .19 .42 .87
Percentage 98.83 .17 1.00
of banks
NOTES: The categories are based on revisions to the level of provisions.The data show the distribution
of the ratio of provision expense to average assets.
SOURCE: Original and revised files of the Report of Condition and Income, Federal Financial Institutions
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or reported only at the behest of examiners. In
addition, banks less than four years old are
excluded, since young banks typically exhibit
unique financial characteristics and are not
directly comparable to more mature banks. The
resulting sample contains 24,519 year-end call
reports for the period from 1996 through 1998.
Results
The analysis reveals an interesting rela-
tionship between revisions to call report data
and exam results.
Frequency and Magnitude of Revisions. While
banks in general seldom revise their financial
reports, when they do, the revision is often sub-
stantial. As Table 1 shows, reported provision
expense was unrevised nearly 99 percent of the
time.
9 Downward revisions were made to only
0.17 percent of the reports. However, banks
revised their provisions upward in 1 percent of
the cases examined, and these revisions tended
to be large. The median ratio of provision ex-
pense to average assets originally reported by
the banks that revised upward is 0.25 percent,
compared with a median ratio of 0.52 percent
based on the revised reports. The same com-
parison holds for the average of the revised pro-
vision expense ratio, which is more than twice
as high as originally reported. These revisions
are sufficient to lower reported profitability
appreciably. For the banks that revised their
provisions upward, the return on assets origi-
nally reported is 1.02 percent, on average, com-
pared with 0.71 percent for the revised reports.
The number of upward revisions in our
sample is fairly small. However, these were
good times for the banking industry. Because
financial problems were few, the need for
increases in provisions could be expected to
have been low. The analysis below controls for
this factor by examining sound and troubled
banks separately.
Financial Problems, Exams, and Revisions. To
investigate whether revisions to provision
expense are driven by examiners’ findings, the
sample is divided into five groups. The first
group contains banks for which an exam began
in the first quarter of the year immediately fol-
lowing the fourth quarter report date. The sec-
ond group is banks for which the first exam in
the subsequent year occurred in the second
quarter, and so on for the third and fourth
groups. The fifth group contains banks that
were not examined in the year following the
call report date.
The banks are also divided into ten asset-
quality categories. These categories are based
on the ratio to assets of loans past-due thirty
days or more and still accruing and nonaccrual
loans. The first group is banks with the lowest
problem-asset ratios and the tenth group those
with the highest ratios. The ratios are calculated
using revised data.
10 Each group contains 10 per-
cent of the sample.
This exercise indicates that banks with
severe asset-quality problems are more likely
than other banks to revise their loan-loss pro-
vision upward. In addition, banks that are
examined—particularly in the first quarter of
the year after the call report date—also are
more likely to raise their provision. As Table 2
shows, almost 10 percent of the banks in the
worst asset-quality group that were examined in
the first quarter revised their loan-loss provision
upward. In contrast, only 1.46 percent of the
banks in the worst asset-quality group that were
not examined in the year following the call
report date revised their provision upward.
Moreover, only 0.76 percent of the banks in the
best asset-quality group that were examined in
the first quarter revised their provision upward.
None of the unexamined banks in the best asset-
quality group raised their provision expense.
Further evidence that exams are a sig-
nificant impetus for call report revisions is
obtained by dividing the banks into two cate-
gories based on whether they were down-
graded by examiners to problem status. Of the
banks examined and downgraded in the first
quarter, 36 percent revised their loan-loss provi-
sion upward. In contrast, of the banks examined
in the first quarter that were not downgraded,
Table 2
Percentage of Banks with Upward Revisions to 
Provision Expense, Year-End 1996–98
Quarter of first exam in subsequent year
First Second Third Fourth None
Asset-quality category
1 .76 .00 .23 .00 .00
2 1.32 .46 .95 .28 .70
3 .57 .43 .89 .00 .29
4 .40 .23 .23 .00 .28
5 1.26 .21 .92 .00 .14
6 1.37 .41 .00 .00 .56
7 .99 .69 .46 .59 .54
8 1.76 1.83 1.09 .59 .71
9 3.26 3.02 .93 1.56 .84
10 9.60 3.37 1.84 1.12 1.46
NOTES: The percentages are based on the number of upward revisions to the level of provisions.
The asset-quality categories are based on the ratio to assets of loans past-due thirty days or 
more and still accruing and nonaccrual loans, where the first group is banks with the lowest
problem-asset ratios and the tenth group those with the highest ratios.The ratios are calculated
using revised data. Each asset-quality group contains 10 percent of the sample.
SOURCE: Original and revised files of the Report of Condition and Income, Federal Financial Institutions
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only 1.4 percent raised their provision ex-
pense. For banks examined in the fourth quar-
ter, about 2 percent of those that were down-
graded restated their provision at a higher level,
while under 1 percent of those that remained 
in nonproblem status revised it upward. These
figures indicate banks that are downgraded by
examiners, particularly early in the year, often
revise the preceding year’s fourth quarter call
report to reflect a greater degree of financial dif-
ficulty than originally reported.
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Summary of Findings. These data provide a
look at the frequency and magnitude of call
report revisions and their relationship to exams.
Upward revisions of provisions are large
enough to reduce profitability appreciably. For
banks in general, the revisions are infrequent.
However, banks with new or emerging prob-
lems often significantly underreport provision
expense. There is a strong relationship between
examiner downgrades of banks and upward
revisions to the provision expense reported for
the previous year, especially when the down-
grades occur early in the current year.
CONCLUSION
This analysis provides direct evidence of
exams’ significant role in uncovering financial
problems and ensuring bank accounting state-
ments reflect them. The auditing role of exams
directly manifests itself in the difference
between original and revised call reports. For
the report dates used in the analysis, more than
one-third of the banks that fell into problem 
status had to revise their most recent call report
to reflect a greater degree of financial diffi-
culty than originally reported. To the extent out-
siders use provisions and ALLL in assessing loan
quality, these results support the view that exams
are important in the public dissemination of accur-
ate information on banks’ financial condition.
The findings also point to the need for 
further research. Because call reports are filed
quarterly, whereas banks are typically examined
about once every twelve to eighteen months,
call report data potentially provide a more up-
to-date picture of a bank’s condition than on-
site exams alone. For this reason, regulators use
call report data extensively in a variety of efforts
to monitor banks’ condition. One such effort
involves the construction and implementation of
statistical early-warning models to identify
emerging financial problems. These statistical
systems typically rely heavily on call report data
for input variables. (Cole, Cornyn, and Gunther
1995 provide an example of this use of call
report data.) However, if call report information
does not accurately reflect financial conditions
when published, the report’s usefulness in
tracking financial developments between on-
site exams could be reduced. Additionally, if
inaccuracies in the call report data are ultimately
corrected, the revisions might overstate the
report’s usefulness in tracking financial devel-
opments in real time, as Cole and Gunther
(1998) point out. These considerations suggest
the need to analyze early-warning models based
on originally published data to assess whether
these models’ ability to identify financial prob-
lems is appreciably lower than that of models
based on revised data.
NOTES
1 Banks can use a reverse provision to remove funds
from ALLL.
2 For simplicity, the text refers exclusively to loan
performance. Losses on leases are treated similarly.
3 Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988) find evidence of income
smoothing and further discuss banks’ motivation for
the practice. See also Wall and Koch (2000).
4 An interagency statement on March 10, 1999, directs
banks to maintain “prudent, conservative, but not
excessive, loan-loss allowances that fall within an
acceptable range of estimated losses” (Securities and
Exchange Commission et al. 1999). The statement
also discusses plans for interagency cooperation in
issuing guidance on appropriate methodologies,
documentation, and disclosure.
5 In addition to examiner review, a bank’s loan-loss
accounting may be reviewed by independent auditors.
While all commercial banks are subject to exams, not
all are subject to external audits. The Federal Reserve
requires bank holding companies with consolidated
assets of $500 million or more to have an annual
external audit. New banks are also required to have
external audits. The Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion requires audits for publicly traded companies,
including bank holding companies. Finally, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991 requires annual external audits for any bank
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. with
assets greater than $500 million (Federal Reserve
Board of Governors 1994).
6 The analysis assumes the judgment of examiners is
correct—that is, an upward revision to provision
expense is taken to mean the initial level of ALLL was,
in fact, too low.
7 As regulators process call report data, substantial
effort is devoted to validating the reported information.
The primary goal is to ensure the data are accurate
before they are published as “final.” While the data 
are typically published about sixty-five days after the35 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  THIRD QUARTER 2000
report date, revisions can be made for up to five
years.
8 Satisfactory status corresponds to a safety and
soundness rating of 1 or 2. Safety and soundness
ratings of 3, 4, and 5 are considered unsatisfactory.
9 In first quarter 1998, banks began reporting provision
for credit losses and no longer reported provision for
loan and lease losses. The new provision covers loan
and lease losses but also includes provisions for
losses on certain types of off-balance-sheet activity.
For simplicity, we refer to provision expense in all
years as provision for loan and lease losses. Banks
continue to report ALLL and now also report an allow-
ance for credit losses, which includes the allowance
for losses on off-balance-sheet activity. Comparing the
two quantities makes it possible to estimate the size 
of the provision for losses on off-balance-sheet activity.
The provision for losses on this activity is very small
overall in comparison with the provision for loan and
lease losses, and for the vast majority of banks the
provision for off-balance-sheet losses is zero.
10 Similar but not identical results are obtained when the
originally reported data are used to calculate the ratios.
11 Upward revisions to provision expense tend to occur
mostly at small and midsize banks. The incidence is
fairly equal for banks with assets under $100 million,
from $100 million to $500 million, and above $500
million but below $1 billion. Banks with assets of 
$1 billion or more have a substantially lower incidence
of upward revisions. However, in our sample few
downgrades occur in the largest size category. 
The relative lack of financial problems among the 
large banks may help explain their low incidence of
upward revisions to provision expense.
REFERENCES
Berger, Allen N., and Sally M. Davies (1998), “The
Information Content of Bank Exams,” Journal of Financial
Services Research 14 (October): 117–44.
Berger, Allen N., Kathleen Kuester King, and James M.
O’Brien (1991), “The Limitations of Market Value
Accounting and a More Realistic Alternative,” Journal of
Banking and Finance 15 (September): 753–83.
Cole, Rebel A., Barbara G. Cornyn, and Jeffery W. Gunther
(1995), “FIMS: A New Monitoring System for Banking
Institutions,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, January, 1–15.
Cole, Rebel A., and Jeffery W. Gunther (1998), “Predict-
ing Bank Failures: A Comparison of On- and Off-Site
Monitoring Systems,” Journal of Financial Services
Research 13 (April): 103–17.
Docking, Diane Scott, Mark Hirschey, and Elaine Jones
(1997), “Information and Contagion Effects of Bank 
Loan-Loss Reserve Announcements,” Journal of
Financial Economics 43 (February): 219–39.
Federal Reserve Board of Governors (1994), “Internal
Control,” Commercial Bank Examination Manual, November.
——— (1999), “Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses,”
Commercial Bank Examination Manual, November.
Flannery, Mark J., and Joel F. Houston (1999), “The Value
of a Government Monitor for U.S. Banking Firms,” Journal
of Money, Credit, and Banking 31 (February): 14–34.
General Accounting Office (1990), “Bank Insurance
Fund: Additional Reserves and Reforms Needed to
Strengthen the Fund,” GAO/AFMD-90-100, September.
——— (1991), “Failed Banks: Accounting and Auditing
Reforms Urgently Needed,” GAO/AFMD-91-43, April.
Gilbert, R. Alton (1993), “Implications of Annual Examina-
tions for the Bank Insurance Fund,” Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis Review, January/February, 35–52.
Greenawalt, Mary Brady, and Joseph F. Sinkey, Jr. (1988),
“Bank Loan-Loss Provisions and the Income-Smoothing
Hypothesis: An Empirical Analysis, 1976–84,” Journal of
Financial Services Research 1 (December): 301–18.
Kwan, Simon, and Randy O’Toole (1997), “Recent
Developments in Loan Loss Provisioning at U.S. Com-
mercial Banks,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Economic Letter, July 25.
Robertson, Ross M. (1995), The Comptroller and Bank
Supervision: A Historical Appraisal (Washington, D.C.:
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency).
Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve Board, Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift
Supervision (1999), Joint Interagency Letter to Financial
Institutions, March 10.
Wall, Larry D., and Timothy W. Koch (2000), “Bank Loan-
Loss Accounting: A Review of Theoretical and Empirical
Evidence,” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic
Review, Second Quarter, 1–19.
Walter, John R. (1991), “Loan Loss Reserves,” 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Review,
July/August, 20–30.